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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Donald Wayne Marvin pled guilty to conspiracy, robbery, 
and the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Marvin 
wanted to appeal aspects of his sentencing, but Marvin's 
counsel filed an Anders motion, requesting to withdraw 
from representing him and expressing his belief that there 
were no nonfrivolous arguments for appeal. After reviewing 
the brief, we conclude that it is inadequate, and deny 
counsel's motion. 
 
In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the 
Supreme Court explained the general duties of a lawyer 
representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal 
when the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued 
representation on the grounds that there are no 
nonfrivolous issues to appeal.1Anders struck down a 
process that allowed courts of appeals to accept a mere 
assertion by counsel that he or she found the appeal to be 
"without merit." Id. at 743. The Court suggested, however, 
that if, after a "conscientious examination" of the record, 
counsel found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal, he or she 
could submit a brief "referring to anything in the record 
that might arguably support the appeal." Id. at 744. Many 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The duties find their roots in the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses, which ensure that an indigent criminal defendant has the right 
to "adequate and effective appellate review." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 
12, 20 (1956). This includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963). This right is 
presumptive, and not confined to those cases in which an independent 
review of the record convinces an appellate court that counsel "would be 
helpful to the defendant or to the court." Id. at 355. Anders explained 
that, while there is some limit to this right, in that counsel may be 
permitted to withdraw from entirely frivolous appeals, the court must 
use procedures to protect against counsel withdrawing when the issues 
are not frivolous. See 386 U.S. 738, 744. 
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courts took this as a prescription, but the Supreme Court 
recently explained that it was only a suggestion. See Smith 
v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000). Each state is free to use 
any process, Smith explained, so long as defendants' rights 
to effective representation are not compromised. See id. at 
753.2 
 
The relevant Third Circuit rule tracks the Anders 
suggestion: 
 
       Where, upon review of the district court record, trial 
       counsel is persuaded that the appeal presents no issue 
       of even arguable merit, trial counsel may file a motion 
       to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. 
       California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which shall be served 
       upon the appellant and the United States. The United 
       States shall file a brief in response. Appellant may also 
       file a brief in response pro se. After all briefs have been 
       filed, the clerk will refer the case to a merits panel. If 
       the panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will 
       grant trial counsel's Anders motion, and dispose of the 
       appeal without appointing new counsel. If the panel 
       finds arguable merit to the appeal, it will discharge 
       current counsel, appoint substitute counsel, restore 
       the case to the calendar, and order supplemental 
       briefing. 
 
Third Circuit Rule 109.2(a). 
 
This rule, like the Anders case itself, provides only a 
general explanation of the contours of the court's and 
counsel's obligations in the Anders situation. However, two 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In Smith, the Court approved California's current approach, by which 
counsel files a brief which summarizes the relevant procedure and facts 
and 
 
       attests that he has reviewed the record, explained his evaluation 
of 
       the case to his client, provided the client with a copy of the 
brief, 
       and informed the client of his right to file a pro se supplemental 
       brief. He further requests that the court independently examine the 
       record for arguable issues. . . . [H]e is silent on the merits of 
the 
       case and expresses his availability to brief any issues on which 
the 
       court might desire briefing. 
 
120 S.Ct. at 753. 
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opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 1997), and 
Wagner v. United States, 103 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1996), have 
shed new light on the interpretation of Anders . These 
opinions fill in gaps left by Anders and its early progeny 
with respect to two critical questions: (1) the responsibilities 
of counsel in submitting an Anders brief (Tabb); and (2) the 
duties of the courts of appeals with respect to an 
independent review of the record (Wagner). 3 In this case, 
because we conclude that the Anders brief was inadequate, 
we need only address the first issue. 
 
In Tabb and its companion case, United States v. Dale 
(consolidated with Tabb on appeal) the Seventh Circuit 
explained the dual duties of counsel in the Anders 
situation: (1) to satisfy the court that he or she has 
thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable 
issues; and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous. See 
125 F.3d at 585, 586. With regard to the first duty, the 
panel recognized that counsel need not, in an Anders brief, 
raise and reject every possible complaint. See id. at 585. 
However, "the brief at minimum must assure us that 
[counsel] has made a sufficiently thorough evaluation of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Wagner, Judge Posner concluded that where an Anders brief 
appeared adequate, it would be inappropriate for a panel "to comb the 
record . . . searching for possible nonfrivolous issues that both the 
lawyer and his client may have overlooked and, if wefind them, 
appointing a new lawyer and flagging the issues we've found for him." 
103 F.3d at 553. Rather 
 
       [i]f the brief explains the nature of the case and fully and 
       intelligently discusses the issues that the type of case might be 
       expected to involve, the Court will . . . confine its scrutiny of 
the 
       record to the portions of it that relate to the issues discussed in 
the 
       brief. If in light of this scrutiny it is apparent that the 
lawyer's 
       discussion of the issues that he chose to discuss is responsible 
and 
       if there is nothing in the district court's decision to suggest 
that 
       there are other issues the brief should have discussed, the Court 
       will have enough basis for confidence in the lawyer's competence to 
       forgo scrutiny of the rest of the record. 
 
Id. Although this approach appears sound, we have no occasion to adopt 
it today, as we reject the Anders brieffiled in this case for facial 
inadequacies. 
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record to conclude that no further discussion of other areas 
of the case is necessary." Id. Applied to the facts of Tabb, 
the court was troubled because 
 
       [w]hile [the brief] makes a series of points that are true, 
       it gives no indication that counsel has determined, 
       following a proper examination of the record, that there 
       is no nonfrivolous basis for the appeal. We wish to 
       emphasize that counsel need not discuss every possible 
       issue. Our concern here is not counsel's decision not to 
       press certain issues, but rather that his discussion 
       does not indicate that he made a reasoned decision not 
       to raise the issues he has omitted. While we give broad 
       discretion to attorneys to decide what matters to 
       discuss in an Anders brief, the degree to which we rely 
       on counsel to determine whether an appeal is 
       warranted requires sufficient indicia in the brief that 
       counsel has made a sound judgment. 
 
Id. Obviously, what constitutes "sufficient indicia" cannot 
be laid down in a formulaic manner, and individual panels 
will have to apply their better judgment to the 
circumstances of each case. 
 
With regard to the second duty, the court held that 
counsel must also explain to the court why the issues are 
frivolous. Discussing Dale, the companion case, the Tabb 
court noted that counsel mentioned several issues but 
 
       rather than explaining why these issues would be 
       frivolous, counsel argues the issues . . . as though they 
       had merit (having disclaimed the arguments as his 
       own, and indicating he was making them only because 
       his client requested that he do so). . . . He simply 
       makes the arguments that [the defendant] requested 
       and then states his belief that other arguments are 
       frivolous, as though this were readily apparent. We do 
       not think it is, and therefore we must deny counsel's 
       motion to dismiss the appeal and withdraw from the 
       case. 
 
Id. at 586. 
 
We follow Tabb and adopt its precepts. We thus conclude 
that, except in those cases in which frivolousness is patent, 
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we will reject briefs, like those encountered in Tabb, in 
which counsel argue the purportedly frivolous issues 
aggressively without explaining the faults in the arguments, 
as well as those where we are not satisfied that counsel 
adequately attempted to uncover the best arguments for his 
or her client. In this case, we reject the Anders petition for 
both reasons. 
 
II. 
 
Donald Wayne Marvin was charged with, and plead guilty 
to, conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by 
robbery, interference with interstate commerce by robbery, 
and using a firearm during a crime of violence. After 
receiving a presentence report and conducting a sentencing 
hearing, the court sentenced him. Marvin pressed for an 
appeal, claiming that there were several sentencing errors, 
but his counsel filed a brief with this court stating that he 
believed there to be no nonfrivolous arguments for appeal. 
Marvin submitted his own brief, opposing the Anders 
motion and raising a host of other issues. 
 
As in Tabb, Marvin's counsel has not provided us with 
sufficient indicia that he has explored all possible issues for 
appeal. As an initial matter, he does not mention all the 
issues raised by his client and assure us that he has 
considered them and found them patently without merit. 
Furthermore, while he lists five issues for potential appeal 
in the beginning of his motion, he only discusses a few of 
them in the body of the brief. Moreover, the record counsel 
has provided does not include the formal sentencing 
objections (although the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing indicates that he made such objections prior to the 
hearing), which might clarify why he ultimately abandoned 
those objections. Counsel simply has not provided sufficient 
indicia that he thoroughly searched the record and the law 
in service of his client so that we might confidently consider 
only those objections raised. 
 
Additionally, as in Tabb's companion case Dale, counsel 
does not explain why those issues that he does address are 
legally frivolous. For example, the heading of thefirst 
section of the Anders brief is titled: "The District Court 
 
                                6 
  
Erred in Assessing an Enhancement to the Sentencing 
Guideline Calculation for Possession, Display or 
Brandishment of a Firearm." In this section, counsel lays 
out Marvin's contentions without explaining why these 
contentions are flawed. Likewise, the third section entitled 
"The District Court Erred in Assessing a Two-Level 
Enhancement to the Sentencing Guideline Offense Level for 
Appellant's Role in the Offense" is argued vigorously by 
Marvin's lawyer, without an explanation for why the court 
should consider the appeal frivolous. 
 
The argument in the second section also falls short. In 
this section, entitled "The District Court Erred in Assigning 
One Criminal History Point for a Conviction Which Should 
Not Have Been Included," counsel lays out an outline of 
Marvin's argument and then states: 
 
       Counsel is aware of no supporting law for this 
       assertion, as the criminal history point in Paragraph 
       71 was assigned for a "prior sentence" pursuant to 
       U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1(c), which requires the addition of a 
       point for each prior sentence [up to 4] which does not 
       result in the length of imprisonment necessary to 
       count under SS4A1.1(a) or 4A1.1(b). Plainly, these were 
       prior "sentences," as defined at U.S.S.G.S 4A1.2(a), 
       and were correctly counted. 
 
The statute to which counsel cites does not, however, 
plainly refute Marvin's argument. Therefore, even this, the 
most extensive effort made in the brief to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of Marvin's claims, is cursory and conclusory. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the Anders  brief filed 
by counsel in this case. By so doing, we do not express any 
opinion as to the merits of any issues in Marvin's 
underlying appeal. We merely note that we are not yet 
ready to decide this case rudderless, without the guidance 
of counsel. The motion of counsel for leave to withdraw will 
be denied. Counsel for appellant shall submit further 
briefing consistent with this opinion.4  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Third Circuit Rule 109.2(a) provides that if the court finds no 
arguable 
merit it will grant the motion, while if the panelfinds arguable merit, it 
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A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
will discharge counsel and appoint substitute counsel. The rule does not 
provide for the circumstance in which the panel makes no determination 
as to whether there are issues of arguable merit or not because the brief 
is inadequate. 
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